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I. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD GRANT PETITIONERS' WRIT OP CERTIORARI.
Two of the considerations listed in Utah R. App. P. 46 apply,
contrary

to

the

Division's

assertion, to

the present case:

Subsection (c) is applicable because the Court of Appeals, through
its Order, has brought into question its recognition of the
exception to the general rule requiring exhaustion of judicial
remedies set forth in Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-14(2) (1991).

This

creates a substantial departure from the previous Utah decision in
Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989), in which the
Utah Supreme Court recognized that an exception for the general
rule requiring exhaustion exists where "there is a likelihood that
some oppression or injustice is occurring such that it would be
unconscionable not to review the alleged grievance."
Subsection (d) of Rule 46 applies to the present case because
the Court of Appeals has apparently decided that there is no
situation in which interlocutory review of an administrative order
is possible, despite the clear language of § 63-46b-14(2). This is
an important question of state law which has not been directly
settled by the Supreme Court, but should be.
II.

THE DIVISION HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE COURT OP APPEALS
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL.
While petitioners do not dispute the fact that the Court of

Appeals summarily dismissed petitioners' Petition without stating
its reasons for doing so, it is not clear from the face of the
Order that the Court made no determination as to jurisdiction. The
predominant arguments raised below by both parties revolved around
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the issue of the Court of Appeals's jurisdiction, so it is at least
arguable that the Court considered

jurisdiction

in its Order.

(Please see the Appendix to this brief and Division's Appendix C.)
The Court of Appeals considered Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)
(1991) as grounds for appellate jurisdiction because the Division
raised this section as grounds for denying jurisdiction in its
arguments

below.

submitted

to the

"A matter

is sufficiently

raised

[lower] court, and the court

opportunity to rule on the issue."

if

it is

is afforded

an

Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917,

919 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Petitioners'

Petition

substantially

complies

with

the

requirements for a petition for extraordinary writ in Utah R. App.
P. 19, and neither Rule 19 nor Utah R. Civ. P. 65B require that a
motion be filed as asserted by the Division.

Rule 65B states that

"[t]here shall be no special form of writ," and Rule 19 designates
the required filing as a "petition for extraordinary writ."
III. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW NON-FINAL
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS IN THE EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES
OUTLINED IN § 63-46B-14(2).
Due process of law in the context of administrative actions,
despite

the

Divisions

assertions

to

the

contrary,

judicial review when such is provided for by statute.

includes

See DeBry v.

Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, 764 P. 2d 627, 627 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) .

Petitioners' argument is based upon statutes, including §

63-46b-14 (2) , which relieve a party seeking judicial review from
the requirement of exhausting any and all administrative remedies
if the administrative remedies are inadequate or "exhaustion of
remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Summary denial

of

judicial

review

under

the

present

circumstances

could,

accordingly, be a denial of petitioners7 due process rights.
The Division's cited cases do not support its contention that
the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction in the present case. DeBry
deals with an appeal from a final order of a local governmental
agency for which there was no statutory provision creating a right
to judicial review.

Barney v. Division of Occupational and

Professional Licensing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Heaton
v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); and Baird v.
State, 574 P.2d 713 (Utah 1978) are not applicable to the present
case because none of the petitioners in these cases, unlike the
present petitioners, raised any allegation of irreparable harm or
insufficient admininstrative remedies, thereby invoking § 63-46b14(2).

None of these cases have, accordingly, ruled on the narrow

issue currently before this Court, so are not controlling.
Generally accepted rules of statutory construction, including
those requiring courts to give the words used in statutes their
plain, ordinary meaning, State in re R.D.S. , 777 P.2d 532, 537
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) , and requiring related statutes to be read
together and construed harmoniously, State v. Chindcrren, 777 P.2d
527, 529 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), require that the appellate courts
recognize the exception to the rule of finality spelled out in §
63-46b-14 (2) .

Adherence to this rule does not, as the Division

suggests, violate this Court's compliance with the UAPA.
IV.

SECTION 63-46B-14<2) DISPELS THE REQUIREMENT OP FINALITY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS IN CASES COMING WITHIN ITS PURVIEW.
The Divisions position that a party cannot obtain judicial

review without obtaining a final administrative order unless he
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

completely bypasses the administrative forum is not supported by
case law, and is inconsistent with § 63-46b-14 (2) , so should be
First, S & G. Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P. 2d 1085 (Utah

disregarded.

1990), cited to by the Division, does not state that the only way
to avoid the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies
is to bypass the administrative forum, but held the opposite,
finding

that

a

party

which

did

not

participate

in

the

administrative hearing did not have standing to appeal the agency's
decision.

Second,

generally

accepted

canons

of

statutory

interpretation require that a statute, including § 63-46b-14(2), be
interpreted according to its common, plain meaning if possible.
The language stating that "the court may relieve a party seeking
judicial

review

of

the

requirement

to

exhaust

any

or

all

administrative remedies" not only refers to bypassing the agency
altogether, but also to not proceeding to a final order even if the
party is appearing before the agency. The Divison's arguments that
interlocutory orders that deal with procedural or evidentiary
issues or which do not affect the rights of the parties are not
contemplated in § 63-46b-14(2) conflict with the statute; the
statutory language is not so restrictive, but includes "any and all
administrative remedies." It is, further, obvious that procedural
and evidentiary orders affect the rights of the parties.
V.

PETITIONERS HAVE RAISED VALID CLAIMS OF IRREPARABLE HARM AND
INADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
The potential harm petitioners will suffer should review of

the Division's orders not be allowed has been outlined in the
previous Petition.

Notably, although this case has received some

press coverage, this is insubstantial compared to the coverage
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

which will occur should petitioners be required to go through an
evidentiary hearing which is open to the press and public.

The

ensuing harm which petitioners will sustain to their personal and
business reputations will be even more substantial.

Although

petitioners may have made a few statements to the press, they have
generally been in the nature of damage control, and made in
response to public announcements and allegations made by the
Division and several of its witnesses.

The Division's continual

recitation of the argument that publicity will not affect the
dental board only serves to beg the argument that petitioners have
raised concerning potential damage to their reputations.
court

can

petitioners7

substantially
Petition

minimize
and

bad

reversing

publicity
the

by

This

granting

Division's

order

authorizing a public hearing.
VI.

THE POTENTIAL HARM TO PETITIONERS FAR EXCEEDS THE PUBLIC
INTEREST IN PROCEEDING TO HEARING PRIOR TO RESOLUTION OF THE
PRESENT ISSUES.
Petitioners do not dispute the well settled principles that

the government's interest in protecting the public health or safety
is paramount, or that the right of physicians or dentists to
practice their professions is necessarily subordinate to that
interest, so the Division's arguments to this effect beg the issue.
The real issue, which should have been addressed but was not by the
Division, is the balancing of the potential irreparable harm to
petitioners against the interest of the public in pursuing a final
order before seeking judicial review, which balancing is required
by § 63-46b-14(2).
In summary, the Division has raised no argument which can
succeed in defeating Petitioner's arguments.
5
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PAUL VAN DAM (#3312)
Attorney General
ROBERT E. STEED (#6036)
Assistant Attorney General
Fair Business Enforcement Unit
36 South State Street, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:(801) 533-3200
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND BRENT
D. HANSEN,
Petitioners,

]
]| MOTION IN OPPOSITION
| TO PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR
]| REVIEW OR, IN THE
| ALTERNATIVE, FOR
| EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF

vs.
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL
AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING,

]
]) Agency Case No. OPL-89-47

Respondent.
Respondent, the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing ("Division"), by and through counsel,
Robert E. Steed, Assistant Attorney General, submits the
following memorandum in opposition to Petitioners' Petition For
Review Or, In The Alternative, For Extraordinary Relief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1• Petitioners are licensees of the Division of Occupational
& Professional Licensing ("Division"),

Petitioners are licensed

to practice Dentistry and to prescribe and administer controlled
substances.
2.

Petitioners are brothers who practice Dentistry together

in two offices located in Spanish Fork and Midvale, Utah,
3.

In August 1989, a petition was filed by the Division

alleging that Petitioners engaged in unprofessional conduct
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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including incompetence in the practice of dentistry, fraudulent
billing practices, over-prescribing controlled substances,
engaging in sexual acts with a patient in exchange for drugs and
taking lewd nude photographs of a patient while she was under the
influence of nitrous oxide,
4.

On June 14, 1991, counsel for the Division filed a

Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Evidence.

Petitioners

filed their response on June 26, 1992. Oral argument was heard on
the Division motion in limine on April 1, 1992.
5.

On April 17, 1992, Administrative Law Judge, Stephen

Eklund, issued an order permitting Petitioner's to present
evidence of K.W.'s or any other witness' prior sexual behavior
"with a licensed health care professional within the context of a
physician/patient relationship, both on cross-examination of that
witness and for possible impeachment purposes of rebuttal."
(Order on Division's Motion in Limine, April 17, 1992

p.9)

Only

evidence of K.W.'s or another witness' "general prior sexual
history or reputation shall be excluded." Id.
6.

On June 21, 1991, Petitioners filed a motion to close

the hearing to the public and a memorandum regarding the
appropriate standard of proof for disciplinary hearings. The
Division filed a response to Petitioner's motion on July 1, 1991.
With respect to the motion to close the hearing, the Salt Lake
Tribune filed a petition to intervene on July 1, 1991.
Administrative Law Judge Stephen Eklund granted the Tribune's
petition on July 2, 1991.
2
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7.

On April 1, 1992 oral argument on Petitioners' motion to

close was heard before the administrative law judge and the
Dentist and Dental Hygienist Licensing Board.

Pursuant to

section 52-4-1 et seq. the Board voted four to two to keep the
hearing open-

On April 7, 199 2 the administrative law judge

issued an order on behalf of the Board providing that the hearing
would remain open to the public.
8.

On April 1,- 1992, oral argument on the standard of proof

was heard by the administrative law judge. The administrative
law judge issued an order on April 17, 1992 stating that
preponderance of the evidence was the standard of proof in
administrative proceedings
ARGUMENT
I. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS LACKS JURISDICTION TO
REVIEW THE ORDERS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AT
THIS JUNCTURE
Petitioners' request for interlocutory review of the orders
of the administrative law judge is not properly before this
court.

Petitioners' request is based on Rule 14 and Utah Code

Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b)(1991) or in the alternative, Rule 19 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 65B of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Despite Petitioners' alternative

theories of jurisdiction, Petitioners have overlooked section 782a-3(2)(a) and section 63-46b-16(l) which vest this court with
jurisdiction to review "final orders" from administrative
agencies. Utah Code Ann. §§ (1953 as amended).

3
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Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) vests the Court of Appeals with
"appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory
appeals, over the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the
district court review of informal adjudicative proceeding," Utah
Code Ann- § (1992).

Moreover, section 63-46b-16(l) of the

Administrative Procedures Act restates that the Court of Appeals
"has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting
from formal adjudicative proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § (1989).
The orders of the administrative law judge, that Petitioners
seek to have reviewed by this court are not final orders nor do
the interlocutory orders of the administrative law judge
constitute final agency action.

A final order will be issued by

the Division only after formal adjudicative proceedings in this
matter have been concluded and all issues pending before the
Division have been determined.
In Sloan v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, the
Utah Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal taken from an order of
the Industrial Commission for lack of jurisdiction.

The

Industrial Commission adopted the findings of the administrative
law judge but remanded the issue of whether claimant was entitled
to medical expenses. 781 P.2d 463 (Utah App. 1989).

The Sloan

court held that the remand order was not a final appealable
order.

"We agree that an order of the agency is not final so

long as it reserves something to the agency for further
decision." Id. at 464.
4
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Attempts to seek interlocutory review of non-final orders of
the agency is not new to the Division.

For example, in Barney v.

Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, the Utah
Court of Appeals recently dismissed an appeal filed by a licensed
health facility administrator whose license is the target of
disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Division.
910755-CA (Utah Ct. App. March, 26, 1992)1

Case No.

The respondent,

Barney, accused of physically assaulting patients and
administering contaminated pills to patients, filed an appeal
from the order of the administrative law judge, Stephen Eklund,
denying his motion to dismiss the Division's petition.

Referring

to Sloan, the court held it did not have jurisdiction to review
the order of the administrative law judge because that order
lacked "finality"•
[T]he requirement of finality contemplates that the
agency proceedings have been brought to their
conclusion by disposition of all issues before the
agency. The denial of a motion to dismiss allows the
proceeding to continue in the agency and is not a final
order for purposes of judicial review.
Id. at 3. (emphasis added)2
The Division acknowledges that this opinion, although
scheduled to be published, has yet to be published and may be
revised or withdrawn prior to publication.
2

.
In an unpublished opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals in
Eliason v. Buhler et al. dismissed an appeal in which a physician,
charged with sexually abusing male patients, brought an appeal
citing to Rule 65B(b)(2) and (4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and Extraordinary Writs under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
The Eliason court dismissed the appeal
because no final order had been issued pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
S#13-1-12(1)(a) (1990). While this opinion does not establish a
binding precedent, it is consistent with appeals court's ruling in
Sloan and Barney.

5
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2. SECTION 63-46b-14(2)(b) DOES NOT CREATE AN EXCEPTION TO
THE REQUIREMENT OF FINAL AGENCY ACTION
Petitioners misinterpret section 63-46b-14(2)(b) as allowing
this court to review non-final agency orders. Although section
63-46b-14(2)(b) does provide an exception to the requirement that
a party exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking
judicial review, it does not excuse the requirement that there be
final agency action or a final order.

Once a case is proceeding

in the administrative forum, review of the agencies orders can
only be had after a final order is issued. Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(a) (1992), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(1)(1989).
To excuse their failure to exhaust administrative remedies
or await a final order, Petitioners claim that they will suffer
irreparable harm if the proceedings before the Division are
allowed to continue on its present course.

Petitioners

specifically refer to the publicity this matter, which is nearly
three years old, has received in the media and press. Although a
complete review of the publicity and attention this matter has
received in the press is not warranted and is irrelevant, it
suffices to say the Petitioners themselves have made numerous
statements to the press, including statements to the national and
local media.

However, regardless of the attention the press or

media has imparted to these proceedings, it is evident that the
Dental Board, who will serve as the fact finder in this matter,
have been unaffected by it.

During a special voir dire

proceeding on April 1, 199 2, counsel for Petitioners was allowed
to question the Board about its knowledge of the case and any
6
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conflict that might warrant the recusal of a Board member.
During voir dire, it became clear that the Dental Board has not
been affected and has remained unaware of pre-hearing publicity
concerning this case.

In fact, counsel passed for cause all

members of the Board excluding its public member who served as a
past director of the Department of Commerce.

The public member

was subsequently recused from participating in these proceedings
because of his prior role with the Division.
Despite, Petitioners assertion that these proceedings are
becoming a "media event", the Dental Board has remained impartial
and unaffected by any media attention given this matter.
Moreover, Petitioners can not be "convicted" by the Dental Board
in any event.

The Board's sole responsibility is to determine

whether Petitioners have violated the rules and laws governing
their profession and what, if any, sanction should be imposed on
Petitioners' licenses.

Consequently, petitioners' claims,

unsupported by memoranda or exhibit, concerning the adverse
impact of publicity in this case is without merit and is
irrelevant to whether this court has jurisdiction to review the
interlocutory orders of the administrative law judge.
3. A FINAL ORDER WILL BE ISSUED ONLY AFTER THE
COMPLETION OF ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND DENTAL BOARD
Final orders of the Division are rendered only at the
culmination of adjudicative proceedings before the administrative
law judge and the professional or occupational board.

Section

13-1-12 provides, "At the close of an adjudicative proceeding,
7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the administrative law judge or an occupational board or
representative committee with assistance from the administrative
law judge, shall issue an order." Utah Code Ann. § (Supp. 1991).
See also, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-16 (Supp. 1991).
Because no final order has been issued, judicial review of
the Administrative Law Judge's orders is premature and
procedurally inappropriate.

There are numerous issues, including

findings on the merits of the allegations, that still must be
determined by the agency.

Despite Petitioners' assertion that it

would be more efficient to resolve legal disputes on appeal to
this court before the hearing, this would be the least efficient
manner to resolve the legal issues raised by Petitioners.

In the

event Petitioners are absolved of any professional violation,
review by this court would be moot. Moreover, rather than review
the orders of the Division in piecemeal fashion, it would be more
practicable to review the orders of the administrative law judge
in conjunction with all other grounds for appeal that may be
filed subsequent to the hearing.
4. PETITIONERS HAVE NOT COMPLIED WITH RULE 19 FOR
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF
Petitioners' motion seeks review of the interlocutory orders
of the administrative law judge under Rule 14 or Rule 19 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Admittedly, Petitioners have

decided to file this motion first as a Rule 14 motion.

According

to Petitioners this excuses the fact that no memoranda or points
and authorities or other supporting documentation has been filed
to support their request.

While Rule 14 does not expressly
8
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require a memorandum on the merits at the time of filing, Rule
23(a)(3)(4) does.
Moreover, Petitioners' reliance on Rule 14 as a
jurisdictional basis to obtain review of an interlocutory order
from an administrative agency is misplaced.

As discussed above,

the court does not have jurisdiction to review non-final agency
decisions and Rule 14 does not provide any extraordinary relief
or alternative remedy that would vest the Court of Appeals with
jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders.
Petitioners' request for agency review bears some
resemblance to the requirements of Rule 5 concerning
Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders. Judging from
the content of Petitioner's memorandum, it contains verbatim the
content requirements for petitions submitted under Rule 5.
However, because Rule 5 applies exclusively to the orders of
"district court, juvenile court, or circuit court", it would have
no application to the interlocutory orders of administrative
agencies.

This is not excluding the fact that under Rule 5,

Petitioners' request for review and this response would be
considered untimely.
As a practical matter, Petitioners should have filed a
motion and memorandum on the merits in so far as they intend to
base their appeal on alternative theories of jurisdiction.
Because Petitioners are seeking extraordinary relief under Rule
19, they should be required to do more than submit mere claims
and assertions, unsupported by affidavits, exhibits or any
9
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competent evidence.

It simply is not fair or judicially

economical for the courts to be placed in the position of telling
petitioners what theory of jurisdiction they will accept and then
give leave to the parties to comply with the filing requirements
of the rules. Rather than give the court a choice of alternative
theories of jurisdiction, Petitioners should have provided this
court with specific grounds and legal arguments to support their
jurisdictional arguments.
Because, Petitioners cite Rule 19 as an alternative theory
of jurisdiction, they are required to comply with the
requirements for a motion under Rule 19. Among other things that
are lacking in Petitioners' motion, Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure requires that Petitioners' motion include "a
statement explaining why it is impractical or inappropriate to
file the petition in the district court" and "a memorandum of
points and authorities in support of the petition.

Consequently,

Petitioners' request for review pursuant to Rule 19 is not
properly before this court and Respondent retains the right to
respond to any motion, properly filed before this court, for
extraordinary relief.

This however, is contingent on whether

Petitioners can now timely file a motion for extraordinary relief
with this court.

In any event, the same arguments addressed

above relating to the exhaustion of administrative remedies and
finality of administrative orders apply with equal force to
Petitioners' request for extraordinary relief.
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Respondent respectfully requests that the court dispose of
all jurisdictional issues and deny Petitioners' request for
judicial review,
CONCLUSION
Petitioners request for review of interlocutory orders of
the administrative law judge is procedurally improper.

This

court lacks jurisdiction to review the orders of the
administrative law judge until the Division issues a final order
in this matter-

Although the requirement also applies with equal

strength to Petitioners' request for extraordinary relief,
Petitioners' request is not properly before this court until the
requirements of Rule 19 are fulfilled.

Consequently, Respondent

request that Petitioners' request for judicial review be denied
for lack of jurisdiction.

Submitted this-~^# day of May, 1992.

"—ROBERT E. ST6ED
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1/ , ' ^ ^ < J 7 i / / c a r t i f v that on

S/^U, S?7. / ? ? J

I served a copy of the attached MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR REVIEW OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF to Jackson Howard, counsel for Petitioners
in this matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail with
sufficient postage prepaid to the following address:
Jackson Howard, Esq.
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
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